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Abstract
We construct a unifying theory of two-stage budgeting and bounded rationality
with mental accounting features. Mental accounting and rational inattention induce
behavioral wedges between first-stage and second-stage expenditure budgets. Be-
cause reviewing one’s financial activities is cognitively costly, consumers might re-
assess only a subset of their spending budgets every period. Over- or under-spending
affects future budgeting and expenditure decisions. We apply latent Bayesian infer-
ence to agent-level weekly expenditure data in order to structurally estimate the de-
gree to which low-income consumers appear rationally constrained with respect to
budgeting. Our findings provide insight into how consumers may respond to inter-
ventions that encourage more disciplined budgeting behavior, like push notifications
in budgeting apps. If consumers are acutely aware of budget misses, they may adjust
budgets upward to avoid the dis-utility of over-expenditure, driving savings rates
and balances downward. In this manner, push notifications that warn consumers
about budget thresholds could backfire and actually lead to budgeting behavior that
reduces savings and wealth in the long-run.
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1 Introduction
We derive a tractable demand model with behavioral features, like mental accounting,
which can be readily estimated using consumer spending data. To do this we build on
the classical two-stage budgeting literature (Strotz 1957; Gorman 1959; Deaton and Muell-
bauer 1980b). In traditional two-stage budgeting consumers optimally form expenditure
budgets for broad commodity groups every period, and liquidity is thus perfectly fun-
gible. Here, we relax this implicit fungibility assumption. Instead, consumers may op-
timally set spending budgets for only a subset of consumption categories each period,
similar to the sparse optimization framework of Gabaix (2014). The degree to which a
consumer treats liquidity as fungible varies both between commodity groups and over
time.
Typically, in two-stage budgeting models, decisions about both allocations to broad
commodity groups and expenditure transactions are made effortlessly and simultane-
ously (Strotz 1957; Gorman 1959; Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b). These models contain
no behavioral constraints that would cause consumers to fail to make optimal budget
plans or even miss their budgeting goals. In addition to specifying a sparse optimization
problem, we introduce explicit timing frictions where first-stage budgets are formed prior
to the realization of a second-stage preference shock. Consumers thus make budgeting
decisions with incomplete information regarding their future consumption needs. One
can think of the model’s timing frictions as producing something akin to a planner/doer
decision problem, where the consumer plans his/her spending in the first-stage and buys
things in the second-stage, as described in Shefrin and Thaler (1981) and Thaler (1999).
Mental accounting tendencies may arise from the timing frictions inherent in a plan-
ner/doer problem if consumers seek to adjust future spending after either over- or under-
spending in the present relative to the budgets they previously set. We thus allow for a
dynamic accounting mechanism whereby consumers keep track of second-stage expen-
diture relative to their first-stage budgets. They can then use that information to shape
both future budgets and future expenditure. In equilibrium these mental accounting dy-
namics affect budgeting decisions in often complicated ways. Since consumers do not
necessarily transfer funds between various first-stage budgets with perfect fungibility,
whether or not over-spending in one category leads to upward or downward budget
adjustments in other categories depends both on which budgets are being re-evaluated
and the elasticities of substitution associated with the individual consumer’s preferences.
Heterogeneous cognitive constraints that lead to anchoring and narrow choice bracket-
ing thus affect the degree to which a consumer exhibits fungible behavior consistent with
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unbounded rationality.
To validate our novel additions to traditional demand systems we provide an empiri-
cal application using anonymized, agent-level transaction data from a large North Amer-
ican bank serving underbanked, low-income consumers. Our empirical estimates indi-
cate that consumer preferences and behavioral tendencies reside on a continuum. Some
consumers exhibit behavior that appears near fully rational within the construct of our
model, while others appear significantly bounded by planning frictions. We thus observe
heterogeneity in consumer behavior that highlights the need for tractable demand mod-
els that allow for differences not only in preferences but also in the underlying structure
of decision processes.
More broadly, our results speak to the limits of prescriptive solutions to encourage
greater financial discipline for low-income and/or liquidity-constrained consumers. Specif-
ically, nudges designed to induce higher savings by encouraging strict budgeting behav-
ior may have unintended consequences. One of our findings is that the degree to which
rationality constraints bind for various consumers is uncorrelated with other consumer-
specific economic outcomes, such as savings rates and income. In a counterfactual sim-
ulation, we also find that relaxing rationality constraints leads to divergent behaviors
that depend in complicated ways on consumers’ preference primitives. Some consumers
would indeed experience welfare improvements and higher savings rates when optimally
re-evaluating their expenditure budgets every period, but many consumers would simply
use more frequent budget reallocations to justify increasingly higher levels of spending.
For this latter group, welfare would fall relative to a model environment where ratio-
nality constraints appear to bind more often. A small subset of this group even go into
debt, and possibly go bankrupt, when allowed to adjust budgets too easily. We conclude
by discussing how these results may inform the effective design of now widely-available
financial planning and budgeting applications and softwares.
1.1 Outline
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we position our work in the broader
literature of two-stage budgeting, bounded rationality, and mental accounting. We then
build a model of two-stage budgeting that incorporates features from behavioral eco-
nomics to allow for endogenous variation and heterogeneity in observed weekly spend-
ing patterns. After presenting and discussing the theoretical model, we describe our
unique dataset of consumer-level weekly spending and income. Next, we develop a
latent-inference estimation routine to uncover consumers’ unobserved budgeting deci-
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sions and mental accounting state variables. Finally, we discuss the results of our esti-
mation and their implications for inference with regards to mental accounting theory and
financial-planning interventions.
2 Literature
2.1 Two-stage Budgeting and Classical Demand
The theory of two-stage budgeting, which posits that consumers first allocate expendi-
ture shares to broad commodity categories prior to making individual spending deci-
sions, provides micro-foundational justification for estimating demand systems derived
from separable utility models. The idea behind two-stage budgeting can be traced back
to theories of aggregation described independently in Hicks (1936) and Leontief (1936).
Each author shows that if the marginal rate of substitution for two goods in commodity
group j is independent of the marginal rate of substitution for two goods in group k, then
preferences are at least weakly separable over those broad commodity groups. Building
on this result while exploiting the equilibrium property that relative prices and marginal
rates of substitution equate, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) argue that if prices for com-
modities within a group move in parallel then weak separability can be assumed. The
consumption decision process can then be framed around these broad aggregates, where
consumers are assumed to allocate resources for consumption expenditure not by opti-
mally responding to posted prices of individual commodities, but only by considering
price levels for broad groups of them. Indeed, tractable demand systems, like the linear
expenditure systems of Geary (1950), Stone (1954), and Houthakker (1960), the Rotterdam
models of Barten (1964), Theil (1965), Barten (1967), Theil (1976), and Barten (1977), or the
almost ideal demand system of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), are generated from a
utility function with some degree of separability, exploiting these aggregation results.
Such models implicitly rely on two strong assumptions about consumer behavior.
First, consumers are assumed to exhibit perfect fungibility; that is, they can freely transfer
money that has been allocated to different commodity-group budgets. Second, first-stage
budgets and second-stage spending are assumed to always equate, so that there are no
timing frictions whereby consumers engage in a level of spending that violates their ex-
ante plans. Our contribution is to consider both theoretical and empirical results from
a model environment in which these assumptions do not necessarily hold. Hence, our
framework relaxes the traditional two-stage budgeting assumptions, where these relax-
ations can be interpreted as allowing for mental accounting behavior.
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2.2 Bounded Rationality and Rational Inattention
Among our additions to the two-stage budgeting framework, we allow for heterogeneous
sparse maximization, similar to the set up in Gabaix (2014). This places our research into
conversation with contemporary economic research, popularized in Sims (2003), where
consumers make decisions under limited information or with limited cognitive resources
to optimize. In our sparse max framework, consumers might only re-evaluate a subset of
their first-stage budgets in any given period (due to the cognitive costs), thereby engag-
ing in narrow choice bracketing (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Read, Loewenstein, and
Rabin 1999; Rabin and Weizsäcker 2009; Felső and Soetevent 2014; Koch and Nafziger
2016, 2019). By allowing for heterogeneous rational inattention and heterogeneous non-
fungibility in this way, our approach reflects a broad literature which suggests there is
no reason to assume that all consumers will regard all attributes of a decision problem
as uniformly salient to the same degree (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009; Bordalo, Gen-
naioli, and Shleifer 2014; Kőszegi and Szeidl 2013; Schwartzstein 2014; Caplin and Dean
2015; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2020; Kőszegi and Matějka 2020). By allowing for
such heterogeneity, we will use our model to show empirically that different consumers
appear rationally constrained to varying degrees over different time intervals.
It is important to note that we are not the first to consider how choice bracketing, bud-
geting, and substitutability are linked. Kőszegi and Matějka (2020) consider a similar, the-
oretical environment to ours, where high attention costs lead to essentially fixed budgets.
A key result in their model predicts that broad budgeting behavior depends on the un-
derlying substitutability of the commodities, so that highly-substitutable commodities are
more likely to be budgeted together. This is an inherent result of a consumer’s inattentive-
ness: s/he lacks the intrinsic ability to think about how to optimally distribute resources
amongst commodities each of which is substitutable with another to varying degrees.
Thus, Kőszegi and Matějka (2020), using behavioral insights, predict the classical aggre-
gation result in Hicks (1936), Leontief (1936), and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) — that
separability is supported if the elemental commodities that comprise broad commodity-
groupings are highly substitutable.
2.3 Mental Accounting
Our approach to modeling mental accounting builds on, but also departs, from prior
work. On one hand, we motivate our model by including budgeting behavior consistent
with some aspects of the planner/doer model in Shefrin and Thaler (1981). On the other
hand, we depart significantly from much of the existing mental accounting literature in
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that we seek to explain behavioral tendencies not as resulting from reference-dependent
utility but rather generated by bounds on cognitive attention. In the context of our model,
a boundedly rational consumer may only have the cognitive attention to re-evaluate and,
if needed, update a subset of his/her first-stage expenditure budgets in a given period.
The degree to which consumers are boundedly rational, in our model, is unrelated to
the degree to which they engage in mental accounting. Nonetheless, mental accounting
may inform budget responsiveness: over-spending in period t could lead to reduced or
increased budgets in period t + 1 depending both on the consumer’s disutility of over-
spending and his/her marginal propensity to save. The so-called ex-ante planner may
take into consideration relative over- or under-expenditure in multiple different commod-
ity groups when making a narrow decision regarding his/her budget for one particular
category, only. In this way, we introduce the accounting mechanism from Thaler (1985)
that dynamically keeps track of over- or under-spending into a model environment where
the breadth of choice bracketing determines the degree to which over- or under-spending
actually affects future budgets.
This interaction governing the degree to which rationality (i.e., budget attentiveness)
is bounded and over- or under-spending impact future budgets is what we interpret as
mental accounting. As Farhi and Gabaix (2020) point out, however, the literature con-
tains no widely agreed upon definition as to what exactly constitutes mental account-
ing. For example, Thaler uses the term to describe different behaviors, such as keeping
track both of spending on certain consumption items and, separately, spending using cer-
tain liquidity sources (Thaler 1985; Thaler et al. 1997). In this paper, we abstract from
method of payment mental accounting dependencies as in Feinberg (1986), Prelec and
Loewenstein (1998), and Mullainathan (2002). This is not a problematic abstraction for
us because the data we use to validate the model are from pre-paid debit card users who
are underbanked and most likely to use their card as their dominant liquidity source.
Since low-income consumers are more likely to be liquidity-constrained and liquidity-
constrained households are budget-sensitive and often engage in non-fungible spending
behavior for basic necessities like food (Gelman et al. 2014; Hastings and Shapiro 2018),
studying the spending patterns of low-income households is a natural application for a
model with endogenous mental accounting and budgeting features. Our empirical ap-
proach thus follows after recent theoretical work in Kőszegi and Matějka (2020), who
show that category-specific budgets are useful for consumers with high attention costs,
many of whom are more likely to be low-income (Mani et al. 2013; Schilbach, Schofield,
and Mullainathan 2016). Given our field data, we thus contribute to the mental account-
ing and budgeting literature by examining the degree to which low-income consumers,
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via their spending behavior, appear to exhibit traits consistent with behavioral theories at
the frontier of present research.
3 Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Column vectors and matrices are denoted with a bold
font. All variables and functions presented, except market prices pt and gross interest
rates rt, are agent-specific, with consumer units indexed by i. Consumers make decisions
in a sequentially dynamic environment, choosing savings so as to satisfy utility over liq-
uidity holdings. Further, consumption expenditure and budgeting decisions will depend
on the previous period’s relative over- or under-expenditure.
We proceed by describing the preference and expenditure mechanisms, then con-
sumers’ budget updating choices. After characterizing equilibrium budgeting decisions
under rationality frictions, we describe the model’s unique ex-ante own-price and income
elasticity predictions. We then analyze the complex interactions between mental account-
ing and optimal budget updating under bounded rationality.
3.1 Preferences and Expenditure
Let zit be marginal period-t savings, mi be the consumer’s borrowing limit, and bit avail-
able bank balances. Account balances evolve according to
bi,t+1 = rtbit + zit (1)
The borrowing limit is such that mi > −bit always.
1 Consumers have preferences over a J-
dimensional vector of real quantities of consumption qit and their total period-t available
resources for spending, zit + mi + rtbit.
2
1In a consumption/savings model with borrowing, such as those featured in Bewley (1986), Huggett
(1993), Aiyagari (1994), and Huggett (1996), mi is a limit to draw upon all available credit. The interpretation
of mi in the context of our model is more narrow. Rather, mi represents the amount a consumer could
feasibly over-draft his/her pre-paid card account. The mechanism is only needed for the rare occasion that
over-drafting is observed, and it is not a critical component of the model.
2In this formulation the consumer has preferences over money holdings. This condition of our model
ensures that consumers never devote all of their available resources to expenditure, desiring instead to
carry money forward in time. Since the dynamics of the model are sequential rather than in terms of
continuation values, if consumers care about balance-matching, as Gathergood et al. (2019) have shown,
we expect that they also care about balance holdings and how their behavior contributes to such holdings.
For other “money in the utility function” models readers should refer to the monetary economics literature
(Brock 1974; Calvo 1983; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1983; Feenstra 1986; Barnett, Fisher, and Serletis 1992; Walsh
2010).
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αi j ln(qi jt + 1) +αi,J+1 ln(zit + mi + rtbit) (2)
This parameterization is chosen both for its classical intuition and identification purposes
when it comes time to estimate the model. This will become readily apparent later on, as
we infer budgeting behavior based on observing only expenditure. The flow utility from
consumption, ∑
J
j=1αi j ln(qi jt + 1), is the classic Stone-Geary representation where we also
assume αi j ∈ (0, 1) and ∑
J
j=1αi j = 1 (Geary 1950; Stone 1954). We set the Stone-Geary
subsistence parameter to -1, thus bounding utility below at zero when qi jt = 0. After
characterizing the income and savings processes, we will return to the utility function to
discuss the role ofαi,J+1.
Let ℓit be period-t income. Let xi jt = p jtqi jt be expenditure on commodity group j.
Note that marginal savings must be





zit can indeed be negative if consumers spend more than they earn in income. After
substituting the expression for zit into (2) it can be shown that the utility function is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in qi jt as long as mi is sufficiently large.
3 Under these
conditions, the utility function is well-behaved and yields unique equilibrium demand
allocations for any given set of prices pt and net liquid resources mi + ℓit + rtbit.
Having characterized savings and inflows, let us return now to the utility function.
Later on it will become apparent thatαi,J+1, which is proportional to the marginal propen-
sity to save, will help govern a lot of the underlying mechanics of the model. Specifically,
3We require that any combination of αi,J+1 and mi is such that maximization of uit in qit yields unique








p jtqi jt − ℓit − rtbit
For strict concavity, we must have
αi,J+1
αi j







p jtqi jt + mi + rtbit
)2
These conditions are readily apparent after twice differentiating uit in qi jt following substitution of zit =
ℓit − ∑
J
j=1 p jtqi jt.
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note that αi,J+1 may be positive or negative. If αi,J+1 < 0, the consumer on average bor-
rows more than he saves. While this cannot be a permanent condition due to borrowing
constraints, it is indeed possible to observe, in a finite sample of weeks, a consumer for
whom αi,J+1 < 0. As αi,J+1 →+ 0 from the right, preferences for saving and thus holding
liquidity decline. Consumers for whomαi,J+1 is positive but close to zero can be thought
of as engaging in hand-to-mouth behavior, consuming almost all of their income every
period.
Expenditure in each commodity group is subject to a separate constraint rather than
one single, perfectly-linear budget constraint. Coupled with ex-ante, category-specific
expenditure uncertainty, this amounts to relaxation of the assumption that resources al-
located toward first-stage budgets are perfectly fungible between commodity groups. In
the standard two-stage budgeting model outlined in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), the
realized expenditure share for group j is always exactly equal to the first stage budget-
ing share. However, we wish to introduce the potential for an intra-period discrepancy
between planned and actual expenditure. For example, a consumer may plan a weekly
budget on Sunday but be confronted with unexpected expenditure mid-week, thus over-
spending relative to the planned budget. In our model separate spending constraints
along with timing frictions between budgeting and spending ensure that the ex-ante first-
stage budgets never exactly equal second-stage realized expenditure, except in measure-
zero occurrences for each j.
Period-t ex-post expenditure in commodity group j satisfies
xi jt = θi jtℓit + γiai jt +ζi jt (4)
θi jt is the share of income devoted to expenditure, ai jt is the consumer’s mental account
balance which encodes the amount s/he over- or under-spent on category j in period
t − 1. γi captures how much a consumer’s mental account balance influences his/her
spending decision. γi is restricted to reside in the unit interval. As γi → 1 the degree to
which a consumer anchors his/her spending the amount over- or under-spent last period
increases. At γ = 0 there is no mental-accounting anchoring effect. We let ζi jt be an
iid idiosyncratic expenditure shock. We assume for each j, that ζi jt is orthogonal to ζi j′ ,t




This shock encodes price-independent unanticipated deviations from the spending plan,
due to everything from weather-related variation to unexpected health shocks. In this
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sense, ζi jt is very similar to a taste shock, causing preferences to appear to vary period by
period. A consumer’s period-t ex-ante expected expenditure in commodity group j is
Eitxi jt = θi jtℓit + γiai jt (5)
where expectations are taken over ζ it, not prices pt which we assume are ex-ante known.
3.2 Mental Accounting
Denote the consumer’s “mental account” by ai jt. This is a state variable that encodes
the amount the consumer over- or under-spent in the previous period, affecting his/her
present expenditure. The consumer uses this mental account to discipline expenditure.
If ai jt < 0 then the consumer over-spent in period t − 1, while if ai jt > 0 he under-spent
relative to expectations. The law of motion for mental account balances is
ai j,t+1 = Eitxi jt − xi jt (6)
ait is J + 1 dimensional where the J + 1 component encodes how much a consumer over-






Note that if ai,J+1,t < 0 then the consumer has under-saved relative to expectations and
vice-versa for ai,J+1,t+1 > 0. By construction ∑
J+1
j=1 ai jt = 0 in every period, so that con-
sumers’ beliefs regarding leftover resources from the previous period do not shift their
aggregated budget set. That is, their perception of how much they over- or under-spent
last period in various commodity groups is exact.4
3.3 Expectations and Uncertainty
At the beginning of a period, consumers are uncertain about ζ it but not pt. Given the
short period length we consider in the empirical application (one week), we argue that
it is not unreasonable to suggest that consumers know the price levels for broad com-
modity aggregates prior to the week commencing. This is not the same as saying that
consumers know the posted unit-prices of commodities within those aggregates. This
assertion may seem strong, but we argue that it is not. Aggregate price levels for broad
4The mental accounting model in Farhi and Gabaix (2020) features the same implicit assumption.
9
commodity groups change very little from week-to-week. A consumer planning his next
week’s consumption expenditure on a Sunday, having most recently gone to the store on
a Thursday, would likely expect to face the same nominal price level. If the price of a
particular commodity within the groceries category, like beef for example, rises, he may
substitute toward a less-expensive commodity like chicken, in order to preserve his gro-
cery expenditure budget. If this is happening implicitly within the category, then such
price-responsiveness would be unobservable to us anyway, given our data feature only
store-level spending totals.
Our argument is supported by evidence in Hastings and Shapiro (2013) that con-
sumers may substitute toward lower-quality products in the event of price increases. In
such a situation, spending for a broad commodity aggregate may appear constant in the
data, despite the fact that the quality of products being purchased has declined. They
show that the link between quality and price sensitivity is best explained by a model,
such as ours, in which consumers budget for specific commodity categories.
Thus, we argue that not incorporating price expectations is a reasonable approximat-
ing assumption in our model for two reasons. Since we do not observe specific com-
modity prices, only indices, we would expect that since such indices barely move over
time, consumers would implicitly know their value. Further, even if they do not, but con-
sumers engage in the type of budgeting we posit, ex-post responses to such unexpected
price changes will not be identifiable anyway. We thus assume that broad price levels are
ex-ante known at the weekly level, which is the period length we consider.
3.4 Choosing Expenditure Budgets
Consumers enter each period knowing the vector of budget weights ascribed to last pe-
riod’s incomeθi,t−1 and the following state variables ait, ℓit, bit, rt, and pt. Herein lies the
planner/doer formulation in the style of Shefrin and Thaler (1981): the “planner” chooses
his budgets ex-ante and the “doer” engages in expenditure ex-post. The doer’s decision is
exactly determined by the expenditure constraint in (4). The introduction of uncertainty
regarding realized expenditure is what differentiates Thaler’s formulation of consumer
decisions from two-stage budgeting models. We incorporate an additional friction that
allows expenditure to exhibit temporary persistence over a few periods.
Drawing on psychological evidence showing that consumers are cognitively constrained
with regards to the number of choices they can consider at one time (Miller 1956; Simon
1957; Cowan 2000), we allow for consumers to possibly update only a subset of their bud-
gets in any given period. That is, consumers may optimally re-evaluate kit ≤ J of their
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budgets for the J different commodity groups. Imposing an integer constraint on the
number of changes that can be made, rather than the magnitudes of the budget updates
themselves, is supported by findings reported in Leslie, Gelmand, and Gallistel (2008)
who argue that integer representations are innate within individual cognitive processes.5
Further, information processing capacity in human memory is fairly limited and has been
shown to impact consumption decisions (Malhotra 1982).6
Following from psychological evidence for the existence of cognitive-processing con-
straints, the budget re-evaluation process operates as follows. In any given period a con-
sumer may re-evaluate his/her weighting variable θi jt for each good or leave it alone.
Let ψi j denote the probability that a consumer re-evaluates the budget for expenditure
in commodity category j, and let Γi jt be an indicator variable that equals 1 when a re-





with Γi jt assumed to be orthogonal to Γi j′ ,t for all j
′ , j. This independence assumption in-
duces narrow choice bracketing and results in a sparse max equilibrium decision structure
like that analyzed in Gabaix (2014). In the context of our problem, a consumer choosing
how to allocate funds across multiple different consumption budgets might only opti-
mally re-evaluate one or two of those budgets in any given period, leaving the remainder
fixed.
Regarding this process, a couple of things are worth noting. First, we do not assume
consumers are choosing whether to re-evaluate a budget; instead, whether or not a re-
evaluation occurs is an exogenous event that happens to the consumer. In certain peri-
ods, this feature allows for spending on certain categories to be more salient to the con-
sumer. Thus, our model allows for the consumer to exhibit the kind of attentiveness
bias described in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2014), Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), and
Schwartzstein (2014). Although a consumer does not choose whether or not to re-evaluate
a budget, conditional upon a re-evaluation being made (Γi jt = 1) the consumer optimally
updates his/her category- j budget by choosing θi jt to maximize expected indirect util-
ity. Otherwise s/he sets θi jt = θi j,t−1 leaving the planned budget weight for commodity
group j alone. Due to this heterogeneous integer constraint, a consumer may change
5For example, findings in Miller (1956) and Simon (1957) suggest that individuals can consider at most
seven choice alternatives at once. Meanwhile, Cowan (2000) says this number is closer to four.
6There is also a relationship between our work and recent work showing that agents exhibit aversion to
complex decision making and prefer decisions wrought from more simplified rules (Oprea 2020).
11
some budgets but not others. Generally speaking this is fine, just assume that if only one
budget is changed then the implicit budget for savings changes as well. Since the expen-
diture system and total savings are perfectly collinear, it is sufficient to only specify how
consumers alter their expenditure budgets.
Let kit = ∑
J
j=1 Γi jt, so that kit describes the total number of expenditure budgets the
agent will optimally adjust in period t. The vector θit is J-dimensional. Denote ϑit as
the kit-dimensional vector which holds, in cardinal order, the adjustable budgeting pa-
rameters of all commodities j for which Γi jt = 1. Note that ϑit is a sub-vector of θit
corresponding to the non-zero indices of Γ it. Let ϑ
∗
it be the optimally-chosen analog of
this vector. Denote Eitvit(θit) as expected indirect utility after dividing each component



















[θi jtℓit + γiai jt +ζi jt] + mi + rtbit
)}
Let ιit(Γ it) be a vector-valued integer function that maps the index of components of
ϑit back into the index of components for θit. This function is ιit(Γ it) : N
J → Nkit and
valid for kit > 0. The function outputs in cardinal order the index of the components of
θit to which we assign the components of ϑ
∗
it. For example, suppose J = 4 and Γ it =(
0, 1, 0, 1
)





Let y index the components of ιit(Γ it), so that ιiyt denotes the y
th component of the
vector ιit.


















= 0, ∀y > 0 and j = ιiyt (8)
Due to the money-in-the-utility-function structure, (8) will always be satisfied in equilib-
rium as consumers equate the expected marginal utility of additional consumption with
the expected marginal utility of additional liquidity.
We can invert (8) under our utility parameterization to arrive at an analytical expres-
sion for equilibrium values ϑit. For some y indexing ιit, let ϑ
∗
i,−yt denote the vector of opti-
mally chosen budget shares which does not include y. Note that this vector may be empty
7Again, recall that expectations are taken only over ζ it.
8In our example above, ιi1t = 2 and ιi2t = 4.
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when no changes are made in a given period. The optimal budget share ϑ∗iyt(ϑ
∗
i,−y,t) for







istℓit + γiai,ιist ,t +ζi,ιist ,t)
ℓit(αi,ιiyt +αi,J+1)
−












where θi jt = θi j,t−1 for j < ιit(Γ it). For the algebra behind this expression, see Appendix
A.1. Recall we assume that ℓit and pt are ex-ante known. When estimating the structural
model without explicitly observing budget-updating behavior, we exploit the indepen-
dence of the components of ζ it to iteratively sample the latent shocks Γi jt and update the
components of ϑ∗it accordingly, taking ϑ
∗
i,−y,t as given. This allows for estimation of the
mental accounting and budgeting parameters without having to iterate over the compo-
nent functions of ϑit as we progress through a Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation
routine.9
3.5 Personal Mental Accounting Equilibrium
Let ti0 be the period in which an individual consumer enters the economy as an au-
tonomous, decision-making agent. Given a sequence of prices {pt, rt}t≥ti0 , a sequence
of income values {ℓit}t≥ti0 , a sequence of idiosyncratic expenditure shocks {ζ it}t≥ti0 , a
sequence of idiosyncratic cognitive shocks {Γ it}t≥ti0 , and initial values for the budget
weights, mental account balances, and bank balances {θi,ti0 , ai,ti0 , bi,ti0}, a personal men-
tal accounting equilibrium consists of:
i. Sequences of policies: {qit, zit,θit}t≥ti0 .
ii. Sequences of balances: {ait, bit}t≥ti0 .
such that in each period
a. Given Γ it, ait, and bit,θit satisfies the sparse max indirect-utility maximization program.
b. Givenθit, ℓit, ait, and ζ it, xit satisfies (4).
9The details of our estimation strategy are left to Online Technical Appendix A, which is available at the
lead author’s website: https://www.npretnar.com/research.
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c. Given xit and ℓit, zit satisfies (3).
d. Mental account balances ait are updated according to (6) and (7).
e. Bank balances bit evolve according to (1).
4 Highlighted Properties of the Model
In this section we explore selected aspects of the model’s behavioral features to under-
stand how budgeting, anchoring, and choice bracketing impact equilibrium outcomes.
First, we demonstrate that the timing frictions between first-stage and second-stage de-
cisions, along with uncertainty surrounding expenditure shocks, lead to non-fungible
behavior. We show that by relaxing cognitive frictions and uncertainty, we can obtain
the classical two-stage budgeting model. Second, we explore how anchoring induced
by mental accounting behavior impacts optimal first-stage budgets. Our results indi-
cate that mental accounting coupled with strongly separable preferences together imply
that losses due to over-spending are fully integrated into their own category’s budget
re-evaluation decision as long as cognitive constraints are relaxed. In the event the con-
sumer is cognitively constrained and does not re-evaluate a particular budget, losses from
over-spending are spread out across the budgets of multiple consumption categories.
Finally, we also explored how model-predicted price and income elasticities respond
to narrow choice bracketing, but for space reasons have relegated these results, which
turn out to be empirically un-interesting, to Online Technical Appendix C. In that ap-
pendix, we show, theoretically, that in the presence of timing frictions the composition
of the narrow choice bracket for optimization can affect own- and cross-price elasticities.
However, we find empirically that such variation is rather insignificant. We also demon-
strate that preferences for liquidity holdings as governed by the parameter αi,J+1 can
induce Giffen-like demand behavior amongst hand-to-mouth consumers. While interest-
ing in theory, no such consumer in our sample exhibits Giffen-like demand behavior. For
these reasons, we focus our primary theoretical and empirical explanations in the main
text around the unique behavioral aspects of our formulation (e.g., narrow choice brack-
eting and mental accounting).
4.1 Non-fungibility Under Budgeting Frictions
In our formulation the consumer’s ex-ante budgeting decisions satisfy the first-order con-
ditions of a sparse max indirect utility optimization problem. By contrast ex-post expen-
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diture is subject to stochastic deviations around expected expenditure. In this way the
consumer anchors expenditure around a chosen budget. Through this channel, resources
allocated toward first-stage budgets are thus not perfectly fungible nor transferable across
second-stage expenditure.
The structure and timing of this decision process has implications relative to how
we typically model a neo-classical consumption/savings problem where the consumer
chooses his/her real consumption level and is not subject to budgeting frictions. Indeed,
if the consumer was to have one-period-ahead perfect foresight, then our model would
collapse into a standard consumption/savings problem with money in the utility func-
tion, where the consumer takes prices as given, choosing a vector of real consumption qit
and savings zit to maximize utility.
In this section we focus on our model’s unique non-equivalence of choosing budgets
ex-ante versus choosing consumption ex-post which is a consequence of the way timing
frictions enter the sparse max optimization problem. Ex-post, after realizing ζ it, there is
no information lost when plugging (3) into (1) to get back the standard budget constraint




xi jt + bi,t+1 ≤ rtbit + ℓit with bi,t+1 > −mi
Note that this substitution cannot be accomplished prior to realization ofζ it due to Jensen’s
inequality. Ex-ante, expected expenditure depends on the budgeting decision of the con-
sumer and his/her expectations over ζ it. When choosing budgets, the consumer inter-
nalizes how balances bit will evolve so that expected expenditure depends on expected
balances by way of the budgeting decision.
Proposition 1: Optimally choosing ex-ante budgets is equivalent to optimally choos-
ing ex-post consumption if and only if consumers have perfect foresight over spending
shocks ζi jt and no cognitive frictions (Γi jt = 1 for all j).
All proofs for propositions and their corollaries are featured in detail in Appendix
A.2. The intuition behind the proof of this proposition is that ex-ante there exists an ex-
pected level of consumption Eitqi jt that also exactly solves the integral in (8), in the case
where ζi jt is not known. This expected level of consumption is a function of the chosen
budget weight, θi jt. Realizing this expected level of consumption as an ex-post actual
consumption level is a measure-zero outcome as long as the measure associated with the
distribution of ζi jt is absolutely continuous. However, even if ζi jt is known beforehand,
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if Γi jt = 0, so that consumers face cognitive frictions in making optimal budget updates,
then the budget share is θi jt = θi j,t−1. It follows that the ex-ante value of consumption,
constrained by a sub-optimal budget weight, will not solve the first order condition in
(8). In this case, even if ζi jt is known, the utility maximizing value of qi jt will not be equal
to the quantity of consumption associated with the sub-optimal budget weight, except,
again, in a measure-zero case. Proposition 1 thus shows that the two-stage budgeting
model with mental accounting collapses into the standard two-stage budgeting model of
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) only when there are no budget-timing or cognition fric-
tions. Uncertainty introduced by rationality frictions causes consumers to deviate from
the optimal consumption allocations implied under classical two-stage budgeting.
4.2 Budgetary Bracketing in Response to Spending Misses ait
Here, we formalize intuition by examining how equilibrium budgets co-vary under dif-
ferent degrees of narrow bracketing. Both the number of categories being updated and
the composition of those categories affects how budgeting updates will respond to over-
or under-spending. Since ϑ∗it is an implicit function component-wise, the total derivative
dϑ∗iyt
dai,ιiyt ,t
includes information regarding how other budgets ϑ∗i,−y,t respond to variation in
the current mental account for commodity ιiyt. Variation in budget ϑ
∗
iyt on over- or under-
spending in category j , ιiyt will also inform equilibrium values of ϑ
∗
iyt. For categories
featuring optimal budget updates (Γi jt = 1), the responsiveness of ϑ
∗
iyt to variation in
ai jt, where j is one of these optimally-updated budget categories, is systematic and pre-
dictable. Yet, over- or under-spending in outside categories j < ιit induces ambiguous
optimal budget responsiveness in the updated categories. In this section and the next, we
will refer to categories for which Γi jt = 1 as “inside” the bracket and other categories for
which Γi jt = 0 as “outside” the bracket.
For all commodities inside the bracket, the total responsiveness of optimal budget






1{ j = ιiyt} −
γiαi,ιiyt
αi,ιiyt +αi,J+1






∀ j ∈ ιit
(10)
where 1{·} is the indicator function that = 1 if the condition it evaluates is true. (10) can
be verified by implicitly differentiating (9) in mental account balances for commodities





indexes the components of ιit. This system is of full-rank and admits a unique solution as
long as certain conditions described in Assumption 1 hold.
Assumption 1: Assume at least one optimal budget update occurs so that kit > 0. As-
sume further that ℓit > 0, γi > 0,αi j > 0, ∀ j, andαi,J+1 > 0.
Proposition 2: Under Assumption 1, without loss of generality, let ιit = (1, 2, 3, . . .) and
suppose ιit is of dimension J
′ ≤ J. Consider the total responsiveness of the components
of ϑ∗it to aiyt where y ∈ ιit.





= − γiℓit .




Proposition 2 characterizes both own- and cross-category responsivenesses described
by (10). For categories inside the bracket, both losses and gains in category j = ιiyt due to
over- or under-spending, respectively, are fully integrated into the optimal budget update




for j = ιiyt. A budget for a specific category increases in constant proportion, depend-
ing on income, for every $1 of over-spending carried forward. For a category inside the
bracket, consumers thus respond to over-spending in that same category by increasing
that category’s budget.
Now consider the remaining categories inside the bracket. Budget adjustments do not
respond to cross-category over- or under-expenditure. For s , y where s indexes a com-
ponent of ιit, simultaneous optimal budget updates to ϑ
∗
ist are independent of the mental
account balance in category j = ιiyt. This can be seen in case (ii) of Proposition 2. Thus,
if the inside bracket is broad enough then cross-category responsiveness is minimized. In
fact if the inside bracket consists of all J categories, all over- or under-expenditure from
the previous period is separately but fully integrated into the optimal budget updates
for each category. For example, suppose a consumer is re-evaluating separate budgets
for “Groceries” and “Gasoline.” The size of the inside bracket is thus kit = 2. Suppose
the consumer under-spent on his grocery budget by $10 (ai jt = 10) for the given week
but over-spent on his gasoline budget by $25 (ai jt = −25). The updated budget for gro-
ceries will take into consideration under-expenditure in groceries but will not take into
consideration over-expenditure on gasoline. This is a direct result of the linearity of the
expenditure system in budget shares and mental account balances, so that when totally
differentiating ϑ∗iyt, variation due to over- or under-expenditure in other inside categories
is fully captured by those categories’ optimal budget updates.
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Over- and under-expenditure in categories outside the optimization bracket, however,
may still affect inside category budgets. If kit < J, strictly, then when updating a budget
inside the bracket, consumers take into account how much they over- or under-spent in
categories outside the bracket. Note that the total derivative describing the responsive-
ness of budgets in category ιiyt to ai jt, where j < ιit, has an implicit expression that de-













∀ j < ιit (11)





Corollary 1 is apparent by directly inspecting (11). Basically, optimal budgetary re-
sponsiveness to over- or under-spending only depends on liquidity preferences and the
long-run expenditure weights for categories inside the bracket. Preference weights for
categories outside the bracket play no direct role.
Corollary 2: Under Assumption 1, if J − kit ≥ 2, so that at least 2 categories are outside







Corollary 2 is also readily apparent by directly inspecting (11). Note that in (11), j
indexes none of the αi,ιiyt , which all correspond to preference weights for commodities
inside the budgeting bracket. Thus, the adjustment rate depends only on other optimal
budget adjustments and the within-category spending preferences, regardless of which
category outside the bracket is associated with the greater budget miss.
Proposition 3: Under Assumption 1, without loss of generality, let ιit = (1, 2, 3, . . .) and
suppose ιit is of dimension J
′ < J, strictly. Then both the sign and magnitude of the total
responsiveness of the components of ϑ∗it to ai jt, where j < ιit, are ambiguous and depend
on the underlying values of the utility parametersαi andαi,J+1.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that budget variation cannot be determined a priori. Gen-
erally, the cross-category responsiveness of inside categories to ai jt outside the bracket
is rather complex. This result builds on Corollaries 1 and 2, which show that only the
values of αi,J+1 and αi j for inside categories matter, but the magnitudes of these param-
eters determine the sign of the budget change. Indeed, there is no hard-and-fast rule as
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to which inside-bracket categories increase or decrease in response to increases in ai jt.
Some categories may see budget increases while others see budget decreases. Further,
this responsiveness will be different for different consumers in different periods since it
depends heavily on both the underlying values of αi and αi,J+1, as well as the elements
of ιit — i.e. the budgets being re-evaluated.
Returning to the case where kit < J, for intuition we present several figures showing
how the components of ϑ∗it together respond to variation in ai jt where j < ιit, under dif-




are featured on the vertical axes while we vary liquidity prefer-
ences, αi,J+1, on the horizontal axes. We simulate several cases where J = 4, while fixing
γi = ℓit = 1. Further, we assign different values to αi j, so that some commodities are
associated with larger average consumption basket shares than others.
Figure 1 shows how
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
, for some j < ιit, varies in αi and αi,J+1. Here, we consider
an environment where kit = 3, and ιit = (1, 2, 3), examining the responsiveness of in-
side categories to variation in the outside account, ai4t. We let good j = 3 be associated
with the largest expenditure share, while good j = 1 is associated with the smallest. In
Figure 1 the utility weights αi are increasing from left to right. The responsiveness is




< 0 under-spending in j leads to a budget reduction in ιiyt. Consumers thus
implicitly use the fact that they believe they have more freedom to spend in j to justify
a more frugal approach to ιiyt. When
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
> 0 the opposite is occurs, which seems to be
simultaneously associated with smaller values of αi,J+1 overall and with categories that
have smaller values ofαi,ιiyt .
The magnitude of αi,J+1 also plays an important role in determining budgetary re-
sponsiveness to over- or under-spending. Asαi,J+1 →+ 0 from the right, hand-to-mouth
consumers appear to respond to under-spending in j by transferring excess funds to cat-
egories with smaller utility weights. Since
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
represents the responsiveness of budget
shares, not absolute budgets, consumers thus increase budget shares more for categories
with lower average expenditure shares, balancing out consumption across the various
categories. In this manner, the preference representation under our decision-theoretic
structure is endogenously non-homothetic, generating non-linear expansion paths in avail-
able liquidity. This is a by-product of the non-fungibilities induced by narrow bracketing.
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(a)αi1 = 0.1 (b)αi2 = 0.15 (c)αi3 = 0.4
Figure 1: (kit = 3; ιit = (1, 2, 3)) From left to right we show
dϑ∗iyt
dai4t
where y ∈ (1, 2, 3) as a function
of αi,J+1. Zero is denoted by a dashed line in each panel. In panel (a) the value of αi j associated
with good j = y = 1 is 0.1, in panel (b) it is 0.15, and in panel (c) it is 0.4. Notice that depending
on αi j and αi,J+1 optimal budget updates respond differently to over- or under-spending in the
non-updated category for which Γi4t = 0.
(a) j = 2; ιit = (1, 2) (b) j = 2; ι
′
it = (2, 4)
Figure 2: (kit = 2) From left to right,
dϑ∗iyt
dai3t
where budget responsiveness for j = 2 under compo-
sition ιit = (1, 2) is presented in panel (a) and under composition ι
′
it = (2, 4) in panel (b). Again,
zero is denoted by a dashed line.
Budget shares respond to outside over- or under-spending in ways that depend on the
size and composition of the inside bracket. Consider, for example, the responsiveness of
budgets for commodity group j = 2 to variation in outside category j = 3 presented in
Figure 2. Between panels (a) and (b) of the figure, we keep kit = 2 but vary the composi-
tion of the inside bracket from ιit = (1, 2) in Figure 2a to ι
′
it = (2, 4) in Figure 2b. In both
panels we show the responsiveness of j = 2. Note that the qualitative change in bud-
getary responsiveness depends on which of the other consumption categories is inside
the bracket. In panel (a), when the inside bracket is (1, 2), budget j = 2 responds to vari-
ation in ai3t by falling for all values of αi,J+1 ∈ (0, 10). Meanwhile, in panel (b) when the
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inside bracket is (2, 4), the responsiveness of budget j = 2 to variation in ai3t is positive
for near hand-to-mouth consumers and negative otherwise, though less negative asαi,J+1
increases. From this exercise we conclude that a complex interaction between preferences
and both the size and composition of the inside bracket determine the degree to which
over- or under-spending in an outside category affects optimal budget weights.
5 Weekly Expenditure Data
One goal of our analysis is to estimate consumer demand parameters while simulta-
neously considering the endogenous link between spending and budgeting decisions.
Moreover, we want to accomplish this using only expenditure data, where control vari-
ables to account for unobserved demand shifts for high frequency, weekly expenditure are
not available to the econometrician. Further, we want to estimate the model despite lack-
ing data about individual spending budgets. Incorporating widely-established bounded
rationality and mental accounting features into a classical two-stage budgeting model of-
fers two important advantages: first, it allows us to place structure on the underlying
budgeting decisions in a way that is consistent with theory; second, it allows for spend-
ing to be responsive to an unobserved state variable that encodes consumers’ budget-
ing misses. With such model components, we can estimate individual price and income
elasticities as well as other behavioral demand features, such as the degree to which con-
sumers appear rationally bounded, using only consumer-level spending data for broad
commodity-group aggregates. In this section, we describe our unique consumer-level
expenditure dataset and some of its features.
Our dataset is an anonymized sample of low-income pre-paid debit-card users from
a large North American bank. It includes weekly totals of consumption expenditures,
income, and running balances. Expenditure is categorized by 4-digit Visa merchant cat-
egory classification codes (MCC).10 To classify expenditure categories we consider only
the first two digits of the MCCs, which give us three explicit consumption categories and
one commodity group that collects all other expenditure.11 The explicit categories we
examine, and their 2-digit MCCs are Groceries (54), Gasoline (55), and Food Away from
10Within the card industry this code is common across all card processors and is also known as the
Standard Industry Code (SIC).
11Note that the fourth category representing all remaining expenditure includes both classifiable trans-
actions that fall outside the 2-digit codes above and cash withdrawals from the account. This means that
some possibly classifiable expenditure may be mis-categorized. Unfortunately, this cannot be reconciled
without making some very strong assumptions with regards to how consumers spend their money.
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Home (58).12 The timeline of observations spans from September 2013 to January 2016
with most agents appearing as active users over only the latter part of this time period.
Thus, the data panel is unbalanced.
After data cleaning and selection, we have a total of I = 2,509 customers with a to-
tal of 71,859 weekly observations. This gives an average of approximately 28 weeks per
customer. Importantly, as we alluded to above, we restrict our sample of consumers to
those who appear to use their pre-paid debit card as their only banking product. That
is, these consumers deposit regular, weekly income to their pre-paid card and use the
card for expenditures on a regular basis. On one hand, restricting the analysis to pre-paid
debit card users limits inferences to only a small subset of the population: namely the
underbanked with limited access to other banking products, such as checking accounts
and credit cards. On the other hand, given data limitations, doing so greatly increases
the probability that the income and expenditure profiles we observe represent complete
consumption profiles for those agents who use this particular product. Each consumer
profile contains at least 16 consecutive weeks of regular income. This ensures that we are
observing a regular income process for the consumer. Finally, we exclude from our sam-
ple consumers for whom we observe at least four consecutive weeks of zero expenditure
in one or more of the aforementioned categories.
Table 1: Summary Statistics Over Agent-level Means
5% 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. 95% S.D.
Weeks 16 20 25 28.640 35 52 11.131
Income 207.096 338.855 460.052 510.732 620.131 981.994 258.288
Balances 6.216 89.953 204.734 500.744 438.464 1, 415.661 1, 868.651
Expenditure
Groceries 11.472 22.282 34.715 42.018 54.195 94.548 30.622
Auto/Gas 13.393 29.191 48.430 60.941 80.198 148.186 46.064
Food Away 14.614 30.179 51.965 68.724 86.684 177.296 61.656
Other 99.211 194.847 283.406 326.124 415.037 687.897 195.551
Number of Consumers I = 2, 509; Total Consumer Weeks ∑i ∑ti = 71, 859
Summary statistics for our entire sample are presented in Table 1, where the units are
12Our goal with category selection is to look at purchasing behavior in categories whose demand has also
been widely analyzed in the literature. For the current analysis, categories have been exogenously defined
in order to discipline inference.
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agent-level averages.13 The median consumer in our sample earns $460.05 per week after
taxes, which aggregates to $23,922.60 per year in nominal dollars. For comparison, con-
sider that median United States household income in 2015 was $56,516 according to the
U.S. Census bureau (Proctor, Semega, and Kollar 2015). 96.8% of our sample fall below
2015 median household income. The 2015 poverty thresholds for one, two, three, and
four person households where the head was under the age of 65 were $12,331, $15,952,
$18,871, and $24,257; 7.8%, 18.3%, 30.8%, and 51.4% of our sample respectively fall below
these corresponding poverty thresholds.14
We do not observe purchase prices at the transaction-level, so we turn to the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) for price indices. Price units are $1982-84 dollars. All price indices
are published at the monthly level, so we use simple linear interpolation to get weekly,
aggregate price estimates. For the prices of groceries and food away from home, we
use the U.S. city average food and beverage price index (series I.D. “CUUR0000SAF”).
For the price of gasoline and other miscellaneous automotive maintenance expenses, we
use the U.S. city average transportation price index (series I.D. “CUUR0000SAT”). All
other expenditure will be deflated using the U.S. city average all items index (series I.D.
“CUUR0000SA0”).
Figure 3 presents the time series of observed expenditures for a selected consumer
whose income is closest to the sample median. We observe 18 weeks of expenditure for
this consumer. Notice that weekly expenditure patterns are spiky yet weakly persistent
— a pattern we observe for many consumers in our sample. Consequently, explaining
these patterns requires a demand model, formalized by theory, that can predict spending
spikes, persistence, and trend decline or growth in individual consumption expenditure
series. The model we have developed can predict all of these features: spending spikes
result from both mental accounting and taste shocks, persistence is a function of bounded
rationality and mental accounting, and changes to average spending and trends are as-
sociated with budget updates. Fitting our model to data thus provides quantitative in-
ferences as to how consumers make high-frequency consumption expenditure decisions
and the tradeoffs they face in doing so.
13For example, in Table 1 “Median” income corresponds to the median agent-level average income and
so on.
14We do not observe the household size in our dataset.
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Figure 3: These are the time series of spending for a selected consumer whose average
weekly income is closest to the sample median. Mean weekly expenditure in each cate-
gory is as follows: groceries $60.67, auto/gasoline $32.50, food away from home $21.98,
and other expenditure $357.00. This consumer earns an average of $460.05 per week and
maintains an average weekly card balance of $115.21 after spending.
6 Structural Model Estimation
Few economics papers that grapple with behavioral phenomena in a decision-theoretic
structural manner attempt to estimate such models using field data. A notable exception
is Hastings and Shapiro (2018), though the authors’ modeling and estimation approach is
different than ours. Specifically, Hastings and Shapiro (2018) take a non-parametric ap-
proach to identifying and estimating the degree to which low-income consumers appear
to be constrained by mental accounting behavior. Given one aim of this paper is to infer
budgeting decisions without observing actual budgets, only expenditure, we require a
parametric model and estimation approach that places structure on the agents’ decisions.
We can then exploit our assumed structure to estimate equilibrium budgeting decisions
as parameters. We do this by turning to the literature in Bayesian statistics that deals
with detecting latent change points of observed time series. Since our time series of bud-
geting decisions ϑ∗it are themselves unobserved, our approach requires us to require that
the equilibrium condition in (9) and the equilibrium laws of motion of mental account
balances in (6) and(7) all exactly hold conditional upon the time-independent preference
parameters as well as estimated latent change points which are identical to the vector of
unobserved budget-updating indicators, Γ it. This is accomplished with an algorithm that
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borrows from the endogenous change-point inference techniques described in McCulloch
and Tsay (1993), Chib (1998), and Koop and Potter (2007) nested within a hierarchical
Metropolis-Hastings (MH) within Gibbs Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling
algorithm (Hastings 1970; Geman and Geman 1984). Our prior assumptions, the likeli-
hood function, an identification discussion, and a thorough description of the sampling
algorithm are all featured in detail in Online Technical Appendix B. Constrained by page
limitations, we focus the paper on both the new theoretical insights that result from our
model formulation as well as their empirical counterparts which result from our estima-
tion routine.
Our structural estimation procedure targets the posterior distribution of model pa-
rameters conditional upon observed data. We must estimate budget weights, mental ac-
counts, and cognitive frictions as latent time series variables, {θit, ait, Γ it}
Ti
t=1 for each
i. Changes to budgets are conditionally identified by level shifts in average spending.
The unknown initial mental account balance ai1 is conditionally identified by the first-
period deviation from average spending. The budgets themselves are identified condi-
tional upon the other parameters and the parametric structure of the model itself.
Due to the vast degree of observed heterogeneity across agents, most of our estima-
tion routine operates only on agent-level parameters. Because of the need to sample latent
time series of consumer decisions, the parameter space is large, containing over four mil-
lion parameters.15 In this section we first explore the posterior distribution estimates from
several versions of the theoretical model with different behavioral features turned on or
off in order to understand how our modeling assumptions contribute to overall model fit.
We then engage in a quantitative discussion regarding the implications of our estimates
for behavioral features such as budgeting, anchoring, and choice bracketing.
6.1 Posterior Distribution Estimates
We estimate several different model specifications using our MCMC estimation algo-
rithm. We then assess and compare the model fit of each in order to understand the
degree to which budgeting frictions and mental accounting features affect predictive in-
ference. First, we estimate the full model described in Section 3. Measures of fitness for
this model are in the first row of Table 2, where we allowψi j, which governs the marginal
probability of a budget update, to be interior to the unit interval and the anchoring-effect
of γi = 1. Then we turn off different model features one at a time and re-run the estima-
15The exact dimension of the parameter space is 4,664,212 with 4,598,976 of these parameters being the
values of latent, time-dependent mental accounting variables.
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tion under different parameterizations. Specifically, our five different model estimations
are run under the following assumptions:
i. Heterogeneous rationality ψi j ∈ (0, 1) and full anchoring, γi = 1 (baseline model).
ii. No anchoring, ψi j ∈ (0, 1) and γi = 0.
iii. Constant budget weights, ψi j = 0 and γi = 1.
iv. Constant budget weights with no anchoring, ψi j = 0 and γi = 0.
v. No budget-updating frictions, ψi j = 1 and γi = 1 (full rationality model).
The last model is designed to best mimic a classical two-stage budgeting problem with
ex-ante preference uncertainty and constant expenditure share preference weights.
Table 2: Model Performance and Comparisons
MH Acc. Rates
Model MAE / ℓ̂i
a lppd b lppd % Baseline c Mean Median Mode
ψi j ∈ (0, 1), γi = 1 0.236 -208,208,458 — 0.159 0.196 0.231
ψi j ∈ (0, 1), γi = 0 0.131 -208,209,461 −4.818 × 10
−4 0.220 0.225 0.230
ψi j = 0, γi = 1 3,904.927 -208,208,979 −2.504 × 10
−4 0.060 0.017 0.008
ψi j = 0, γi = 0 180,077.100 -208,209,690 −6.368 × 10
−4 0.178 0.194 0.215
ψi j = 1, γi = 1 0.148 -208,209,783 −5.920 × 10
−4 0.199 0.230 0.231
a MAE / ℓ̂i =
1
I J ∑i ∑ j
1
Ti
∑t |x̂i jt−xi jt |
ℓ̂i
where the predictive mean is x̂i jt =
1
N ∑n x̃i jtn with atomic MCMC predictions x̃i jtn,
indexed by n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
b lppd is the log-pointwise predictive density which we take from Gelman et al. (2013). This number is








. Bigger numbers (the closer to 0 in our case) indicate better model fits.
c Since the baseline estimation of the full model with ψi j ∈ (0, 1) and γi = 1 has the largest lppd, this column represents the
percentage loss of information in other models’ predictive power relative to the baseline. Negative numbers indicate worse fit
than baseline, positive better. Note that all values are negative, so that the full baseline model fits best.
In each estimation, we initialize the MCMC integration scheme with random gener-
ates from the prior distributions, except for ai1 which we set to 0 to start. We then proceed
to iterate through a chain of length 100,000. That is, we operate on the agent-level MH
within Gibbs blocks 100,000 times and the global blocks 100,000/100 = 1,000 times. We
set a burn-in period of 30,000, keeping every 100th agent-level draw and every global
draw thereafter, giving us a total of 701 draws after burn-in and trimming. The sampler
operates with agent-level blocks parallelized over a 128-core computer, requiring just un-
der 48 hours to completion. For the internal Gaussian quadrature routine on (9), we use
44 = 256 quadrature points.
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In Table 2 we present measures of model performance and fitness.16 In the full baseline
estimation, ψi j is fully sampled and allowed to vary in (0, 1) and agents’ expenditure
time series are serially dependent via ai jt since γi = 1. Our two main summary statistics
comparing model fit are 1) mean absolute predictive error (MAE) as a fraction of each
agent’s average income ℓ̂i and 2) a log-pointwise predictive density (lppd) information
criterion as described in Gelman et al. (2013). As a measure of model convergence and
performance we also present the mean, median, and modal MH acceptance rates for the
agent-specific MH within Gibbs sampler. Model fit is notably poor when budget weights
are assumed to be constant, ψi j = 0. When budget updating frictions are lifted (ψi j = 1
with γi = 1) and serial dependence is shut off (γi = 0 withψi j ∈ (0, 1)), MAE as a fraction
of average income is lower than in the full model, yet the lppd information criterion
suggests the full model is still a better fit. For this reason the full baseline model is our
preferred specification because of this, so we refer to its parameter estimates throughout
our empirical and counterfactual analyses.
Figure 4: Black lines represent actual weekly spending for the median income agent,
while red lines represent the baseline model’s predicted means with 95% confidence re-
gions in pink.
16In addition we present a grid of plots for the various agent-level parameter means and global parameter
draws from the MCMC routine in Online Technical Appendix C to visualize the sampler’s autocorrelation
in n. Given our burn-in period length and trimming, autocorrelation is minimal and the sampler appears
to have converged.
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Table 3: Posterior Summary Statistics for Agent-Level Means, ψi j ∈ (0, 1) & γi = 1
What Parameter 5% 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. 95% S.D.





a 0.029 0.059 0.092 0.106 0.135 0.228 0.064
α̂i2 0.037 0.080 0.130 0.146 0.192 0.313 0.088
α̂i3 0.039 0.079 0.125 0.150 0.197 0.340 0.097





σ̂ai1 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.024 0.007
σ̂ai2 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.028 0.009
σ̂ai3 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.034 0.011




σ̂i1 10.413 17.618 24.948 29.422 35.938 58.297 24.353
σ̂i2 10.703 19.863 30.062 45.888 49.646 134.167 54.355
σ̂i3 15.890 30.065 46.923 63.459 72.629 169.564 63.851





τ̂i1 0.021 0.124 0.163 0.750 0.303 3.660 2.546
τ̂i2 0.020 0.115 0.160 0.997 0.298 4.576 3.340
τ̂i3 0.017 0.103 0.139 0.903 0.253 3.808 3.633





β̂i1 1.016 1.112 1.169 1.741 1.303 4.594 2.512
β̂i2 1.011 1.102 1.165 1.988 1.293 5.614 3.307
β̂i3 1.010 1.087 1.146 1.900 1.264 4.780 3.624
β̂i4 0.999 1.064 1.14 1.567 1.202 3.870 2.007
Liquidity Preferences α̂i,J+1 8.763 10.483 11.557 12.166 13.047 17.521 3.336




ψ̂i1 0.293 0.531 0.704 0.666 0.832 0.913 0.197
ψ̂i2 0.280 0.508 0.674 0.645 0.812 0.902 0.197
ψ̂i3 0.250 0.448 0.599 0.589 0.750 0.879 0.197






b 0.028 0.057 0.092 0.202 0.142 0.270 1.968
θ̂i2 0.037 0.079 0.128 0.326 0.200 0.355 4.362
θ̂i3 0.037 0.081 0.131 0.448 0.217 0.424 6.893






c 0.304 0.175 0.307 0.348 0.488 0.943 0.205
Γ̂i2 0.291 0.196 0.340 0.369 0.513 0.935 0.205
Γ̂i3 0.260 0.260 0.417 0.427 0.575 0.911 0.205




âi1 −10.406 −4.310 −1.700 −0.305 1.410 10.685 36.213
âi2 −14.962 −4.045 −0.807 0.420 3.055 19.626 33.026
âi3 −26.813 −8.967 −3.824 −3.187 1.166 16.576 62.525
âi4 −83.045 −27.907 −8.817 −158.691 6.692 68.265 8,556.193
Global Mean of µ̂αi,J+1 µ̂µ
d 9.677 12.351 15.269 15.260 18.036 20.959 3.593
Global S.D. of µ̂αi,J+1 σ̂µ 0.368 0.537 0.659 0.623 0.708 0.784 0.127
a Second subscript corresponds to commodity group — groceries ( j = 1), auto/gasoline ( j = 2), food away from home
( j = 3), and other expenditure ( j = 4) .
b For time-dependent parameters, θi jt, Γi jt, and ai jt, we average over both posterior draws and time for each agent and
each commodity category. The statistics presented are summary statistics over these agent-level averages.
c The agent-level means for the budget-updating indicators are taken from the baseline model where Γi jt = 1 if
|θi jt −θi j,t−1| > 0.
d µ̂µ and σ̂µ are the only two global parameters. They are summary statistics over agent-level µ̂αi,J+1 . From simulations,
we found that these parameters are needed to induce posterior shrinkage.
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To visually illustrate how well the baseline model fits the data, Figure 4 presents the
time series of expenditures (black lines) along with predictive means (red lines) from
the full model estimation with ψi j ∈ (0, 1) and γi = 1 for the median income consumer.
Summary statistics over agent-level means for parameter estimates are presented in Table
3. For parameters that are time dependent, we average both across MCMC draws and
over time for each agent. For the global parameters, we simply take summary statistics
over the outputted chain.
One thing stands out in Table 3 amongst the mental accounting parameters: the vari-
ances of the posterior distributions of agent-level mental account balance means âi are
large. Note that some of the likelihood variance estimates σ̂2i j are also large. These
high values are not surprising given the spikiness of the various time series. Remem-
ber, ai j,t+1,n = −ζi jtn, so high variance in ζi jt will lead to high variance in âi j as well. This
variability propagates through the model via optimal budget updates ϑ∗iytn. Lacking ex-
plicit budgeting data, this posterior variability is to be expected. Further, estimates at the
fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles are reasonable, so high likelihood variance should not be
cause for suspicion with respect to the validity of our results.
6.2 Budget-updating Behavior
Our model estimates provide empirical inference regarding the degree to which con-
sumers face cognitive constraints with respect to budgeting. Here, we focus on the model’s
predicted number of total budget updates kit each period.
By definition a budget update has occurred if θi jt , θi jt. In such a case, Γi jt = 1
regardless of the magnitude of the difference |θi jt −θi j,t−1|. This means that we may infer
Γi jt = 1 even if the magnitude of the budget-share differences is very small. Since neither
budget shares nor the shift indicators are known, model-estimated incremental changes
of small magnitudes might be attributable to noise. In our baseline estimations we allow
Γi jt = 1 any time θi jt , θi jt. We then consider several thresholds ǫ > 0 where we encode
a switch (i.e., Γi jt = 1) when the threshold is exceeded — |θi jt −θi j,t−1| > ǫ.
Figure 5 provides visual summaries of the estimated total number of budget switches
kitn = ∑
J
j=1 Γi jtn under different updating thresholds. ǫ roughly represents the minimum
fraction (in units of income) the consumer would ever consider adjusting his budget on
a week-by-week basis. For example, if a consumer makes on average $100 per week,
then ǫ = 0.01 means that the consumer would never actively adjust his budget by less
than $1 = 0.01 · $100. In panel (a) we present the density of agent-level averages, k̂i. In
the baseline model we estimate that consumers make an average of 2.48 budget updates
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: In panel (a) we present the posterior density of k̂i =
1
N Ti
∑n ∑t ∑ j Γi jtn, i.e. the number of
budget changes each period averaged over time and across MCMC draws for each agent, using a
smoothed Gaussian kernel with the Silverman rule-of-thumb for choosing the bandwidth (Silver-
man 1986). In panel (b) we show the marginal posterior probability mass function for the atomic
posterior draws (epochs) of kitn. Colors denote different thresholds for judging when a budget
update has occurred. In the baseline scenario we assume that any time θi jtn , θi j,t−1,n a budget
update has occurred. In other scenarios we allow for the fact that model-estimated incremental
changes may just represent noise around some true budget value. In these scenarios Γi jtn = 1 only
if |θi jtn −θi j,t−1,n| > ǫ where ǫ ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5}.
every week. This number falls when we consider different minimum thresholds — 2.29
with a 1% threshold, 1.70 with a 5% threshold, 1.22 with a 10% threshold, 0.61 with a
25% threshold, and 0.30 with a 50% threshold. In panel (b) we present the marginal dis-
tribution of total budget updates across agents, time, and epochs. Even with only a 5%
threshold (green), less consumers appear fully rational choosing kit = J = 4 less than 5%
of the time. With no threshold full rationality is exhibited just over 15% of the time.
Table 4 presents the fractions of budget updates that satisfy the given tolerance thresh-
olds relative to the baseline threshold of zero. In the top half of the table, we compare the
different thresholds to the baseline model (ψi j ∈ (0, 1) and γi = 1). In the bottom half of
the table, we compare the different thresholds to the model where consumers are assumed
to be fully rational, so thatψi j = 1 and thus Γi jt = 1 always. We find very little difference
between the two models regarding the fraction of budget-share updates that surpass the
pre-defined tolerance thresholds. This attests to the stability of our results: regardless of
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whether consumers are assumed boundedly or fully rational, we estimate that first-order
behavior is on average the same. This result lends support to our assumption that kit is or-
thogonal to the budget-updating decision process in the boundedly-rational model. This
is because, otherwise, we would expect more budget updates to exceed higher tolerances
in the boundedly-rational model than the fully-rational model, where consumers are as-
sumed to always make incremental adjustments. If kit were to be endogenously linked
to the magnitude of budget adjustments, then in such a model where kit is allowed to be
< J, sticky-budgeting behavior over multiple periods would lead to adjustments of high
magnitude when they do occur, however infrequently, but that is not what we observe.
Broadly, our results indicate that few consumers update all of their budgets every
period, providing evidence for binding cognitive constraints and narrow bracketing. At
the same time, these constraints do not appear to force agents to stick with budgets for
long extended periods. Thus, while agents do not consistently update their budgets every
week, neither do they neglect these budgets over long extended periods.
Table 4: Share of Budget Updates by Magnitude of Change, Conditional on Γi jtn = 1
(Baseline) Conditional on γi = 1 and ψi j ∈ (0, 1)
> 0.01 > 0.05 > 0.1 > 0.25 > 0.5
Groceries 0.888 0.551 0.310 0.083 0.028
Auto/Gas 0.908 0.615 0.385 0.135 0.052
Food Away 0.923 0.701 0.505 0.214 0.079
Other 0.984 0.921 0.842 0.628 0.368
Total 0.923 0.684 0.493 0.247 0.121
(Full Rationality) Conditional on γi = 1 and ψi j = 1
a
> 0.01 > 0.05 > 0.1 > 0.25 > 0.5
Groceries 0.874 0.532 0.300 0.079 0.025
Auto/Gas 0.893 0.591 0.366 0.132 0.052
Food Away 0.897 0.672 0.489 0.223 0.092
Other 0.985 0.927 0.859 0.669 0.430
Total 0.912 0.681 0.503 0.276 0.150
a In this simulation’s baseline θi jt , θi j,t−1 always, since the budget weights are
assumed to be optimally updated every period. The values presented in this part
of the table represent the fraction of updates that exceed the posted thresholds, ǫ.
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6.3 The Relationship Between Budgets and Mental Accounts
How do the sign and magnitude of estimated budget adjustments ∆θi jtn = ϑ
∗
iytn −θi j,t−1,n,
for j = ιiyt, depend on the underlying mental account balances aitn? In this section we
consider some empirical analogs to Propositions 2 and 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2 described
in Section 4.2. Recall, Proposition 2 states that for commodity groups contained in the
inside bracket, j ∈ ιit, losses and gains due to over- or under-spending in previous peri-
ods are fully incorporated into the given commodity group’s updated budget share. Yet,
Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 demonstrate that the composition of the outside bracket,
j < ιit, and a consumer’s liquidity preferences, αi,J+1, will together determine both the
sign and magnitude of the total change, ∆θi jtn. In this section we focus on the frac-
tions of consumers who, on average, on average, appear to decrease their budget weights
(∆θi jtn < 0) whenever optimal updates are made (Γi jtn = 1), conditional upon the signs
of the components of aitn and the composition of ιitn.
In Table 5, rows one and two present the fractions of consumers who, on average, ad-
just downward (∆θi jtn < 0) after having over- or under-spent respectively in the same
category associated with the optimal budget adjustment.17 In row three, we present the
fraction of consumers who, on average, appear to make larger absolute budget changes
after over-spending relative to under-spending. This last data point is a measure of the
proportion of consumers who tend to exhibit loss aversion with respect to correcting bud-
gets in response to over- or under-expenditure. The definition of loss aversion we thus
employ is one that occurs at the intensive margin (differences in the signs of budget up-
dates conditional upon the signs of ai jt), not the extensive margin (whether or not budget
updates occur). We expect consumers’ budgets to be more sensitive to ai jtn < 0 if they
are loss averse, and indeed we find that, across every consumption category, a slight ma-
jority of consumers in our sample seem to be loss averse. Note, though, that there is
substantial heterogeneity, both across consumers and consumption categories, for all of
these statistics.
Nonetheless, consumers, overall, tend to adjust their budgets downward both af-
ter over- and under-spending, though this tendency is slightly more pronounced after
under-spending than over-spending. Note the distinction between the magnitude of the
budget adjustment and the probability that a downward, as opposed to upward, adjust-
ment occurs. Loss averse consumers will make budget adjustments of larger magnitude
17The reader should be aware that the statistics presented in Table 5 do not directly correspond to the
total derivatives discussed in Section 4.2. This is because, in the context of the data-generating process
we observe, all components of aitn are varying simultaneously, so that within-category and cross-category
effects from those categories for which j < ιitn both simultaneously impact the sign and magnitude of atomic
estimates for ∆θi jtn.
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after over-spending. Consumers in general, however, are more likely to downward adjust
after under-spending, but such adjustments are of less magnitude than those after over-
spending. Thus, a consumer may both exhibit loss aversion, according to our definition,
but also be less likely (probabilistically) to make such downward adjustments.
Table 5: Budgeting & Mental Accounting Tendencies, Conditional on Γi jtn = 1
Conditional on the sign of Within-category ai jtn
a
Groceries Auto/Gasoline Food Away Other Total e
Share Adjust Down, ai jtn < 0
b 0.561 0.590 0.535 0.466 0.472
Share Adjust Down, ai jtn > 0
c 0.571 0.599 0.537 0.481 0.500
Share Loss Averse d 0.513 0.522 0.510 0.504 0.555
a Specifically, we examine the sign of ∆θi jtn conditional on the sign of ai jtn.
b The agent i statistic is
∑n ∑t ∆θi jtn1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn<0}
∑n ∑t 1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn<0}
< 0 for ιiyt = j.
c Here, just flip the sign of ai jtn:
∑n ∑t ∆θi jtn1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn>0}
∑n ∑t 1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn>0}
< 0 for ιiyt = j.
d For each agent i, the underlying statistic is
∣∣∣∣
∑n ∑t ∆θi jtn1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn>0}
∑n ∑t 1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn>0}
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣
∑n ∑t ∆θi jtn1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn<0}
∑n ∑t 1{Γi jtn=1,ai jtn<0}
∣∣∣∣ < 0 for ιiyt = j.
e For the “Total” column, we must additionally average over j.
We previously noted that optimal budgets covary negatively with their own men-
tal account balances, which is described in Proposition 2. Note, however, that Propo-
sition 3 demonstrates that the cross-category variation can be ambiguous. This helps
reconcile the results we observe in Table 5. Row one, which describes downward ad-
justments in response to over-spending, demonstrates, for example, that consumers ad-
just their budgets downward (following over-spending) approximately 59% of the time
for “Auto/Gasoline” purchases. This suggests that cross-category variation dominates
within-category variation for automotive-related purchases following over-spending, since
Proposition 2 suggests we would otherwise expect an upward adjustment. The opposite
is true for the catch-all “Other” category, which also is associated, on average, with larger
basket sharesαi j. By inspecting the expression for
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
in (10), it is clear that ifαi j is large
for the “Other” category, the within-category responsiveness will dominate potential am-
biguities from cross-category responsiveness.
Recall, by Proposition 3, that budget updates respond to over- or under-spending in
outside categories in ways that depend on the underlying preference parameters of the
agent. Table 6 shows how cross-category responsiveness for outside categories, j < ιitn,
impacts the sign of ∆θi jtn. Like in Table 5 we consider the sign of budget adjustments
in category j conditional on the sign of ai j′ ,tn where j
′ , j and j′ < ιitn. Downward ad-
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justments are more common across consumers, across commodity groups, and over time
for all inside commodity groups except the “Other” category. For “Auto/Gasoline” and
“Food Away” we observe a slight, but consistently higher propensity to adjust downward
in response to under-spending in all outside categories relative to over-spending. One can
see this by noting the “Auto/Gasoline” and “Food Away” in the bottom half of the table
all have slightly larger values than those in the top half. This runs counter to what men-
tal accounting theory under broad bracketing would predict, providing model support
that consumers are indeed narrow bracketers. Under broad bracketing we would expect
more frequent upward adjustments of optimally-updated budgets conditional on under-
spending in the outside bracket. In this scenario a consumer would implicitly move what
he/her perceives to be excess funds left-over in outside categories to form larger bud-
gets for inside categories. Instead, our results suggest that consumers are more likely
to move inside-category budgets downward despite excess perceived funds, a tendency
which is reflective of budgeting discipline that results from narrow-bracketing behavior.
While “Groceries” and “Other” have more mixed outside-responsiveness differentials
conditional on the signs of ai j′ ,tn, we only observe a tendency toward broad bracketing
mental accounting behavior for the cross-category responsiveness of “Groceries” budgets
to “Food Away” and the “Other” budget to “Auto/Gasoline.” Upward adjustments for
“Groceries” are thus relatively more frequent after under-spending in the “Food Away”
category, which reflects a relative tendency for consumers to persistently integrate gains
from going out to eat back into their budget for eating at home. This slight differen-
tial thus may be indicative of consumers engaging in persistent bouts of frugality over
multiple weeks by sacrificing eating out (arguably more of a luxury) for eating in. With
regards to the relationship between “Other” and “Auto/Gasoline,” there is not an obvi-
ous or clear story that comes to mind. In general the results here support the notion that
consumers are narrow bracketers with respect to mental accounting.
We draw several conclusions regarding mental accounting behavior and bounded ra-
tionality from these exercises. First, substantial heterogeneity is observed with respect
to whether or not consumers exhibit loss aversion. Approximately 55.5% of consumers
— a slight majority — exhibit consistent loss-averse behavior, though this varies across
consumers and consumption categories. Second, mental accounting behavior is substan-
tially idiosyncratic, which is not surprising given the observed heterogeneity in agent-
level weekly expenditure patterns. Finally, we provide evidence that consumers engage
in narrow choice bracketing with respect to mental accounting. That is, they do not ap-
pear to use mental accounting to justify over-spending in what category by implicitly
re-appropriating funds left-over after under-spending in another category.
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Table 6: Budget Updates Conditional on the Outside Bracket, j′ < ιitn
Share Adjust Down Conditional on ai j′ ,tn < 0
Outside ai j′ ,tn Groceries Auto/Gasoline Food Away Other
Groceries — 0.555 0.500 0.479
Auto/Gasoline 0.538 — 0.502 0.469
Food Away 0.554 0.570 — 0.481
Other 0.546 0.570 0.511 —
Share Adjust Down Conditional on ai j′ ,tn > 0
Outside ai j′ ,tn Groceries Auto/Gasoline Food Away Other
Groceries — 0.560 0.511 0.476
Auto/Gas 0.545 — 0.524 0.476
Food Away 0.547 0.583 — 0.473
Other 0.549 0.577 0.523 —
6.4 Relations Between Bounded Rationality, Income, and Savings
In this section we analyze the joint relationships between posterior budget updates kit,
income ℓit, and savings zit. We find the following: 1) budget-updating behavior is gen-
erally random and uncorrelated with particular, broad characteristics of the consumer,
such as his/her earnings potential and savings behavior; 2) while, on aggregate, income
and savings rates tell us very little about how a consumer will systematically engage in
budgeting, within a consumer unit income and savings rates over time are associated
with variation in kit, though relations are idiosyncratic, and these tendencies are sub-
ject to substantial heterogeneity across consumer units; 3) most consumers have slightly
higher savings in periods with more budget updates, though this finding is also rather id-
iosyncratic; 4) budget updates occur at slightly higher rates when consumers experience
positive versus negative income shocks in the same period, though the aggregate distri-
bution of k̂i conditional upon income shocks is unchanged; 5) in periods after high income
shocks, most consumers actually adjust their budgets less often. The results outlined in
this section thus show that consumers are substantially heterogeneous with how they en-
gage in budgeting behavior, while providing weak evidence that kit may be endogenous.
A previously-discussed limitation of our exercise is that we could account for such endo-
geneity by allowing agents to choose when they want to pay attention to their budgets,
thus implicitly selecting kit, though our data limitations prevent this. Since we do not
observe budgets or mental accounts, we must estimate them first in order to estimate kit.
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These data limitations thus require us to assume kit is a structural residual. Future work
should validate our exercises here on datasets that record explicit budgeting behavior.
Figure 6 shows contour plots of the joint distributions of average income, average sav-
ings rates, and k̂i. We find little correlation between the consumer-unit summary statistics:
average weekly income appears only slightly positively correlated with average weekly
budget updates (Pearson’s ρ = 0.104), while the average savings rate appears uncor-
related with k̂i (Pearson’s ρ = −0.0125). Since we are integrating both over the entire
posterior distribution of draws kitn and time, this exercise demonstrates that estimates
of cognitive frictions, Γ it, appear to be orthogonal to an agent’s average income level ℓ̂i,
which is exogenous, and propensity to save. We thus conclude that a consumer’s aver-
age behavior with regards to budget attentiveness does not appear to be associated with
either their earnings potential or average savings behavior.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: This figure characterizes the joint densities of agent-level average income (a)
and savings (b) and the agent-level average number of budget updates, k̂i, where such
averages are taken over posterior epochs and time.
However, within each consumer unit budget-updating behavior can still be strongly
associated with fluctuations in personal income over time. Further, we find that most
consumers (69.5% of the sample) tend to engage in relatively higher savings (for them) in
periods featuring greater budget attentiveness. To demonstrate consumer heterogeneity
along these dimensions, we compute agent-specific Pearson’s coefficients for the corre-
lation between ℓit and posterior k̂it as well as zit/ℓit and posterior k̂it over time within
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the consumer unit. The density estimates across consumers for these coefficients are pre-
sented in Figure 7. Consumers appear equally likely to have either higher or lower rela-
tive income in periods of greater rationality, which can be seen by noting the symmetry
of the left panel. However, for more consumers periods with greater rationality are also
associated with higher relative savings rates, which can be seen by noting the density in
the right panel is skewed positive.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Here we present kernel density estimates of Pearson’s coefficients across agents
for correlations between k̂it and ℓit (a) and k̂it and zit/ℓit (b). The median correlation
(dashed black lines) in panel (a) is 0.012. In panel (b) it is 0.124.
To assess whether the relationship between budget-updating and income may be non-
linear and thus inadequately explained by Pearson’s correlation coefficients, we check if
there is any difference between k̂it in periods when ℓit is 10% higher or lower than ℓi,t−1.
Figure 8a plots the conditional kernel density estimates of k̂i under different income-shock
scenarios against the baseline. Figure 8b plots the densities of differences of k̂i relative to
the baseline estimate. Specifically, in Figure 8b, negative values mean that the baseline k̂i
is less than the conditional estimate, while positive values mean the baseline estimate is
greater than the conditional estimate. We find that 60.6% of consumers in our sample tend
to make more budget updates in periods when income rises by 10%, while 38.3% of con-
sumers tend to make more updates in periods when income falls by 10%. However, the
magnitude of these differences is slight (median difference of −0.029 after 10% positive
shocks versus a median of 0.038 after 10% negative shocks). We conclude that while k̂i is
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slightly correlated with income shocks, the relationship does not appear significant.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Panel (a) demonstrates that the estimated distribution of k̂i, conditional on the
consumer realizing a 10% positive or negative income shock, appears unchanged from
the baseline estimate. Panel (b) demonstrates that within a consumer unit, we observe
enough heterogeneity such that more consumers are likely to make more adjustments
(red) after a high shock and fewer adjustments (green) after a low shock.
To address the possibility that a consumer’s budget-updating behavior is made in
response to past income or in anticipation of future income, we consider the correlation
between k̂it and ℓi,t±s, where s ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In Figure 9 we plot the conditional densities
across agents of Pearson’s coefficients measuring the correlation between budget updates
and past and future income. We find no systematic relationship between budget updates
and anticipated income, as seen in panel (b) where the densities are centered around
zero. In panel (a) we see that there appears to be no systematic relationship between
k̂it and income two and three periods in the past. However, k̂it and ℓi,t−1 are negatively
correlated for approximately 62.9% of consumers (red).
Together, the results presented in Figures 8 and 9 provide weak evidence that budget-
updating behavior is correlated with exogenous income. Specifically, consumers appear
to be less budget attentive in the immediate period after experiencing a high income
shock, though more budget attentive during the period in which the high shock occurs.
Again, though, this relationship is weakly systematic, as there is substantial heterogeneity
with respect to how budgeting and income are related.
Finally, we can also check whether the correlations between individual budget-updating
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: Panel (a) presents the densities of Pearson’s coefficients across agents measuring
the correlation between period-t k̂it and ℓ− i, t − s. Panel (b) presents correlation coeffi-
cients measuring the relationship between k̂it and ℓi,t+s.
behavior, income, and savings over time are at all systematically associated with the aver-
age income distribution. That is, do consumers who are more likely to engage in budget
updates after high (low) income shocks earn more on average? Do consumers who are
more likely to save at higher rates in periods of many (few) budget updates earn more on
average? For both of these questions, the answer again appears to be ‘no,’ as we find no
significant relationships between a consumers estimated Pearson’s coefficient from the
previous exercise and either their average weekly income or savings. Those who tend
to save more in periods of greater rationality do not save more than others on average.
Those who are more rational in periods when they have relative higher income do not
earn more than others on average. Thus, how people adjust their behavior period-by-
period in response to income shocks and the relaxation of rationality constraints is also
rather idiosyncratic.
6.5 The Relationship Between Savings and Mental Accounting
In this section we explore how savings in period t depends on whether or not the agent
is estimated to have previously over- or under-saved. Recall that over-saving in pe-
riod t − 1 implies ai,J+1,t < 0, not positive, so that over-spending in t − 1 is associated
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with ai,J+1,t > 0. We find that after periods in which consumers over-spend on ag-
gregate, they build up account balances by increasing savings rates, while after under-
spending savings rates decline, and consumers are more likely to splurge. This is true
for 87.1% of consumers in our sample. For the other 12.9% of consumers, savings rates
after over-spending are on average lower than savings rates after under-spending. These
consumers thus persistently, over multiple periods, engage in over- or under-spending
relative to pre-determined budgets and do not appear to use mental accounting tech-
niques to regulate their overall expenditure. Further, we assess whether the persistence
of over- or under-saving is associated with the degree to which consumers are estimated
to be boundedly rational, finding no significant relationship between estimates of k̂i and
differences in savings behavior.
Figure 10 presents several plots that characterize relationships between average sav-
ings rates ẑit/ℓit and posterior-estimated average over- or under-spending from the pre-
vious period, âi,J+1,t. In panels (a) and (b) we show the joint densities of mean savings
rates for periods following over- and under-spending, respectively. After over-spending
savings rates are skewed positive, while after under-spending they are skewed nega-
tive, suggesting that many consumers in our sample appear to use mental accounting
to regulate their period-by-period spending and bank account balances. This is evi-
dent by the fact that savings as a fraction of income is on average lower (higher), and
indeed mostly negative (positive), after under(over-)-spending, so that consumers ap-
pear to spend down (replenish) positive (negative) mental account balances. In panel
(c) we plot the density of the difference in agent-level average ẑit/ℓit in periods follow-
ing over-spending (âi,J+1,t > 0) versus under-spending (âi,J+1,t < 0). This distribution
skews positive since most consumers have positive zit/ℓit when âi,J+1,t > 0 and negative
zit/ℓit when âi,J+1,t < 0. Finally, we consider the relationship between the conditional
difference in savings rates and k̂i finding no statistically significant correlation between
the two. Thus, mental accounting consumers are no more likely than those whose sav-
ings behavior exhibits stickiness inconsistent with mental accounting to be more or less
boundedly rational.
For most consumers ẑit/ℓit and âi,J+1,t are positively correlated. In Figure 11 we select
two consumers from our sample who differ in their savings behavior as it relates to mental
accounting. In both panels black lines represent total absolute savings zit while red lines
are posterior average âi,J+1,t with a corresponding 95% confidence region in pink. Recall,
when âi,J+1,t > 0, the consumer under-saved (over-spent) in the previous period. Panel
(a) features data from the median income consumer unit in our sample, while panel (b)
features data from a consumer who responds to under-saving by continuing to negatively
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(a) Savings Rates After Over-spending (b) Savings Rates After Under-spending
(c) Density of Differences Across Agents (d) Savings Differentials and Budget-updating
Figure 10: Here we plot several kernel density estimates to demonstrate how savings rates
respond to relative over- or under-spending. Panels (a) and (b) show the joint densities,
across agents, of average savings rates zit/ℓit conditional on âi,J+1,t > 0 and âi,J+1,t < 0,
respectively. The vertical axis in panel (a) features the absolute value of |âi,J+1,t|. Panel
(c) plots the density of the difference between conditional savings rates when âi,J+1,t > 0
and savings rates when âi,J+1,t < 0. Panel (d) compares this same difference with the
agent-level average number of budget updates, k̂i.
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save over subsequent periods. Meanwhile, the median income consumer behaves accord-
ing to standard mental accounting theory: s/he increases savings after under-saving, thus
replenishing depleted balances. For the consumer in panel (b), zit and âi,J+1,t appear to
co-move negatively, suggesting a period of under-saving is followed by successive peri-
ods of under-saving, though each of lesser magnitude, until finally after a few periods the
persistent cycle of under-saving is broken. The two examples thus illustrate the degree to
which consumers in our sample are heterogeneous with respect to how they use mental
accounting to regulate total spending and savings.
(a) Median Income Consumer (b) Consumer with Negative Co-movement
Figure 11: Black lines represent zit, while red lines represent posterior average âi,J+1,t.
The 95% confidence region is in pink. In panel (a) the median income consumer saves
33.2% more after over-spending than after under-spending. This is close to the median
consumer in our sample who saves 29.2% more on average, where the first and third
quartiles of this distribution are 11.1% and 50.7%, respectively. The consumer in panel (b)
saves on average 23.4% less after over-spending than after under-spending.
6.6 Counterfactual Welfare Under Relaxed Rationality Constraints
To understand how consumer welfare is affected by relaxing the sparse max constraint
on budget updates, we counterfactually simulate consumer expenditure using the poste-
rior distribution of parameters from the full baseline estimation, except we force Γi jt = 1
for all i, j, and t combinations. This is equivalent to setting the primitive preference pa-
rameter ψi j = 1, for all i and j. Specifically, the reader can think of this counterfactual
as what might happen if a consumer had a financial planner or budgeting application
constantly nudging them to engage in optimal behavior, so that they always check their
budgets for all categories every week. Note that this experiment is not the same as the
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estimation where we force ψi j = 1 and estimate the additional parameters separately.
Here, we use the parameter estimates from the main estimation where ψi j is a free pa-
rameter and γi = 1, counterfactually only assuming the distribution of Γi jt changes, not
the other model primitives. Specifically, we compare the counterfactual predictive utility
against the posterior predictive utility from the full baseline model, as opposed to actual
utility under the posterior parameterization. The reason for this is that we care about how
model predictions change, given the parameter change. The exercise amounts to assessing
the total variation in model predictive outcomes under coarse variation in ψi j.
In the counterfactual set up, each period every agent chooses ϑ∗it by maximizing indi-
rect utility subject to the relaxed constraint that kit = J always. Broadly speaking, under
this counterfactual the average consumer in our sample experiences a 1.8% reduction in
posterior average predicted flow utility when ψi j = 1 versus when ψi j ∈ (0, 1). For
70.4% of consumers, engaging in weekly budget updates for every commodity category
does not lead to welfare improvements relative to the posterior predictive baseline.
However, as we have thus far emphasized, there is substantial heterogeneity with
respect to how different individual consumers’ behaviors change when rationality con-
straints are relaxed. In fact we find that those who are most rationally constrained are
most vulnerable to experiencing adverse outcomes due to interventions designed to in-
crease financial attentiveness by sending kit → J.
Let ũi be the average (over atomic epochs and across time) counterfactual posterior
flow utility of agent i. Let ûi be the average (again, over atomic epochs and across time)
predicted posterior flow utility of agent i. The ratio ũi/ûi is our primary measure of
counterfactual variation in individual welfare due to relaxing the rationality constraint.
If ũi/ûi > 1, the consumer is better off when fully rational. If ũi/ûi < 1, the consumer
is worse off when fully rational. Amongst those who are worse off, the most vulnerable
have ũi/ûi < 0 due to ũi < 0. Note that average utility is negative if, on average, savings
plus account balances approach the borrowing limit, i.e. zit + rtbit → −mi.
18 We classify
this last group of consumers as bankrupt, and they constitute a subset of those who are
worse off: just over 0.5% of the sample goes bankrupt which is approximately 1% of those
who are worse off.
Figure 12 presents kernel density estimates of k̂i conditional on consumers being “Bet-
ter Off,” “Worse Off,” and/or going “Bankrupt” due to the relaxation of the rationality
constraint. On the whole there is no statistically significant difference between the dis-
tributions of consumers who are “Better Off” and “Worse Off,” though “Bankrupt” con-
18Posterior predicted average utility, ûi, is always greater than zero for all consumers since borrowing
limits are never reached in reality.
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Figure 12: This figure features the density of k̂i conditional on the counterfactual type
of consumers. Those who are “Better Off” derive higher utility from being more bud-
get attentive, while those who are ”Worse Off” derive lower utility. Consumers who go
“Bankrupt” constitute a small subset of those who are “Worse Off.”
sumers have significantly (statistically speaking) different underlying behavioral profiles
than either of the broad groups. Of those who go bankrupt, they have on average lower
k̂i in the baseline estimation. Thus, they appear to be more likely to use sticky budgets to
regulate their spending.
Now consider these results in the context of financial-planning and budgeting apps,
such as Mint, YNAB (You Need a Budget), EveryDollar, Honeydue, and Personal Capi-
tal. With such apps, users can opt-in to receive push notifications to their smart phones
telling them when their spending in a given period for a specific spending category is
approaching some pre-set budget. If the app allows consumers to readily change their
budgets without incurring a penalty, consumers may opt to raise their budgets in the
middle of a period in order to avoid being continually pestered by push notifications. At
the extreme, this behavior would lead to the bankruptcies we observe, but can still make
other consumers who do not go bankrupt worse off. The push notifications, presumably
designed to nudge consumers toward financial discipline, could thus have the opposite
effect. A consumer who raises his budget in response to push notifications now anchors
future spending around a higher pre-set target while income remains the same. This then
causes savings to fall, and the process may repeat itself over future periods until the bor-
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rowing limit is reached.
Our results thus provide evidence that consumers who use sticky budgets as heuristic
rules of thumb to regulate spending patterns are most vulnerable to adverse outcomes
when such budgets can be easily changed. This counterfactual result should be informa-
tive to financial-planning app designers. Apps should limit the ability of consumers to
change budgets on the fly, either by placing restrictions on how often or when budgets
can be changed or by imposing some kind of cost. Even simply making it difficult for
a consumer to change a budget by burying such features deep in an app could mitigate
potential backfires.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a structural model of two-stage budgeting with bounded rational-
ity and mental accounting features. The model generates reference dependence and loss
aversion with respect to expenditure budgets using a standard, quasi-concave, mono-
tone, and continuously-differentiable utility function. By incorporating bounded ratio-
nality and mental accounting into the classical two-stage budgeting model, we can en-
dogenously explain idiosyncratic, short-term variation in agent-level consumption ex-
penditure patterns. Further, by allowing for narrow choice bracketing and reference de-
pendence, we show that our model with all the features motivated from behavioral eco-
nomics generates empirical estimated of behavioral inferences with respect to budgeting,
choice bracketing, and anchoring. These results should encourage future work that seeks
to unify well-established classical theories with contemporary behavioral ones in order to
structurally explain empirical phenomena in consumer decision making.
An important result in our paper is that most consumers are neither fully rational in
the traditional sense — i.e., no cognitive constraints; regularly updating all of their bud-
gets — nor fully behavioral — i.e., fully bounded; never updating any of their budgets.
Instead, most consumers are somewhere in between: they update some, but not all, of
their budgets every period. This idea, that consumers are rational to some extent, pro-
vides a more nuanced model of consumer decision-making than ‘all-or-none’ theories
that assume either full-rationality or little-to-no rationality. More broadly, we hope to
see the debates between ‘rationalists’ and ‘behavioralists’ shift from focusing on whether
consumers are rational to instead asking how rational they are, what variability there is
in the level of rationality, and what could be driving this variability, as also suggested
in Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013). Whereas previous work has identified within-
person variance in the extent to which behaviors follow standard rational (vs. behavioral)
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models of decision making, such as Olivola and Wang (2016), our work highlights the im-
portance of considering the variability of behavior across consumers.
Finally, we see several avenues for future work. The proliferation of financial-planning
apps to which consumers link all of their expenditure and savings accounts, from credit
cards, checking accounts, and investment accounts, should prove useful to economists
looking to study consumer spending in more detail. The work we present here is likely
thus the first in a long series of forthcoming papers that may use agent-level, high-frequency
data to structurally gain better insight into consumer behavior. Specifically, future work
should consider using data from financial-planning apps where budgeting and attentive-
ness, like say through app log-ins, can be explicitly measured in order to validate our
latent inferences. Such apps could also prove useful for engaging in field experiments
to explicitly test how individuals respond to different kinds of notifications and to then
understand how their responses are related to other aspects of their financial behavior.
There thus exists broad potential for many new insights to be gleaned from these trea-
sure troves, and we hope that we have inspired economists to explore such agent-level
spending data in more detail.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Inversion of Optimal Budgeting Equation
Suppose there exists at least one j for which Γi jt = 1. For some y indexing ιit, let ϑ
∗
i,−yt
denote the vector of optimally chosen budget shares which does not include y. Note that
this vector may be empty. The optimal choice of budget share ϑ∗iyt(ϑ
∗






αi,ιiytℓit −αi,ιiyt ∑ j∈ιit(Γ it) j,ιiyt
(ϑ∗i jtℓit + γiai jt +ζi jt)
ℓit(αi,ιiyt +αi,J+1)
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where θi jt = θi j,t−1 for j < ιit(Γ it), and expectations are over ζ it.
To show this, first, we will make a slight transformation to the indirect utility function
which will greatly aid with computation of first order conditions. For each additively
separable utility component we can write ln(qi jt + 1) = ln(xi jt/p jt + 1) = ln(xi jt + p jt)−
ln(p jt). We can thus transform indirect utility to permit direct substitution of xi jt for each























j=1 ln(p jt) can be safely left outside of the expectation since we assume price
levels entering the week are known to the consumer. Now under this parameterization,
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y′=1(ϑiy′ ,tℓit + γiai,ιiy′ ,t ,t +ζi,ιiy′ ,t ,t)− ∑
J
j=1(1 − Γi jt)(θi jtℓit + γiai jt +ζi jt) + mi + rtbit
}
(A.3)
Ignore expectations for now, divide by ℓit which is assumed known, and multiply both
sides by the terms in the denominator to get
αi,ιiytℓit −αi,ιiytℓitϑiyt −αi,ιiyt ∑
j∈ιit(Γ it)
j,ιiyt
(ϑi jtℓit + γiai jt +ζi jt)




(1 − Γi jt)(θi jtℓit + γiai jt +ζi jt) +αi,ιiyt(mi + rtbit)
= αi,J+1ϑiytℓit +αi,J+1(γiai,ιiyt ,t +ζi,ιiyt ,t) +αi,J+1 pιiyt ,t
(A.4)
Isolate ϑiyt and take expectations to get (A.1).
A.2 Proofs
Proposition 1: Optimally choosing ex-ante budgets is equivalent to optimally choos-
ing ex-post consumption if and only if consumers have perfect foresight over spending
shocks ζi jt and no cognitive frictions (Γi jt = 1 for all j).
Proof. For the following proof, fix ℓit, ait, and pit.
(⇐) With perfect foresight, by definitionζ it = 0 since there is no uncertainty. If Γi jt = 1
for all j then consumers make optimal updates to each budget weight for each j, where
it is sufficient to drop the expectations operator since ζ it = 0. Further, note that since zit
can be written as a function of qit the equilibrium condition in (8) in the main text, where
48

































Now suppose rather than choosing ex-ante budget weights, consumers choose ex-post
consumption. The optimal choice of qi jt must satisfy the equilibrium condition in (A.7).
The choices are thus equivalent.
(⇒) For this logical direction, we engage in proof by contrapositive. Suppose now
that either consumers do not face perfect foresight, so that they do not know ζ it ex-ante,
or there are meaningful cognitive frictions, that is ∑
J
j=1 Γi jt < J.
First, let us consider the case where ζ it is unknown ex-ante but ∑
J
j=1 Γi jt = J, so that
there are no cognitive frictions. Note that ex-ante budgets ϑ∗iyt must satisfy the main equi-







with q̃i jt in the expected indirect utility function. Note that for


























Ex-post q∗i jt(ζi jt) satisfies (A.7) by construction. Since the random variableζi jt enters (A.8),
q̃∗i jt , q
∗
i jt except for a measure-zero realization of ζi jt. Since q̃
∗
i jt is completely determined
by ϑ∗iyt, ℓit, ai jt, and p jt, it follows that ex-ante budget choices are not equivalent to choices
of ex-post consumption if ζi jt is not known. Clearly this holds for all j.
Now suppose ζ it is known but ∃ j such that Γi jt = 0. The consumer thus cannot choose
an ex-ante budget for category j and sets his budget such that θi jt = θi j,t−1. There is











where the dependencies are to note that the first order condition is evaluated at θi j,t−1.




this value will not force the left hand side of (A.9) to equal zero. Sinceθi j,t−1 is fixed, there
exists q∗i jt that satisfies (A.7) and q
∗
i jt , q̃i jt. The proof is complete. 
Proposition 2: Suppose at least one optimal budget update occurs so that kit > 0. As-
sume ℓit > 0, γi > 0, αi j > 0, ∀ j, and αi,J+1 > 0. Without loss of generality, let
ιit = (1, 2, 3, . . .) and suppose ιit is of dimension J
′ ≤ J. Consider the total responsiveness
of the components of ϑ∗it to aiyt where y ∈ ιit.





= − γiℓit .




Proof. Consider the system of implicit component-wise total derivatives in equation (12)
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Note that (A.15) is indeed a solution, and it is the only solution since A has full rank J′





by inspecting the row-wise dot products on the left hand side of (A.16). This result holds
for all values of y ∈ ιit indexing aiyt, so that a simple re-arrangement and re-definition of
the indices for y , 1 will yield the same outcome. 
Corollary 1: Suppose at least one optimal budget update occurs so that kit > 0. Assume
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ℓit > 0, γi > 0,αi j > 0, ∀ j, andαi,J+1 > 0. For categories outside the bracket where j < ιit,
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
is independent ofαi j.
Proof. Note that the only channel through which
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt




s , y. But, it can be verified by inspecting equation (11) in the main text that all values of
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
only depend onαi j′ where j
′ ∈ ιit. 
Corollary 2: Assume ℓit > 0, γi > 0, αi j > 0, ∀ j, and αi,J+1 > 0. If J − kit ≥ 2, so that at














s indexes all components of ιit. By independence, we can redefine the indices for the
outside categories and the value of
dϑ∗iyt
dai jt
will be unchanged. Thus, the definition (index)
of the outside category being considered has no bearing on the value of the derivative.
This completes the proof. 
Proposition 3: Under Assumption 1, without loss of generality, let ιit = (1, 2, 3, . . .) and
suppose ιit is of dimension J
′ < J, strictly. Then both the sign and magnitude of the total
responsiveness of the components of ϑ∗it to ai jt, where j < ιit, are ambiguous and depend
on the underlying values of the utility parametersαi andαi,J+1.
Proof. We will prove this by considering two numerical parameterizations and showing
that both the signs and magnitudes of the total derivatives are different under the differ-
ent parameterizations. Without loss of generality, let J = 4 and J′ = 3. Let γi = ℓit = 1.
Let αi = (0.1, 0.15, 0.4, 0.35)
⊤ and consider two values for αi,J+1 — α
1
i,J+1 = 0.1 and
α2i,J+1 = 5. ιit = (1, 2, 3) so that j = 4 is the category for which Γi jt = 0. The relevant









































































Now consider two equilibrium solutions to this system underα1i,J+1 andα
2
i,J+1. Note that






















Clearly, depending on the value of αi,J+1, ϑ
∗
i1t either goes up when ai4t goes up or goes
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